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ABSTRACT 
Cybersecurity has become an essential topic in introductory information systems (IS) core courses. As an aid to course design, 
the exploratory research in this paper uses a social representations lens to elucidate the perceptions of cybersecurity and 
cybersecurity threats held by students. Analysis of qualitative survey data from 152 students at a university in the Western 
U.S. identified 23 concepts forming the students’ collective understanding of cybersecurity. Presented in the form of a social 
representations map, the findings reveal student perspectives that can be used to motivate and enhance learning about 
cybersecurity threats and mitigation strategies. Interpretation of the map indicates that students’ sensemaking about 
cybersecurity places the strongest emphasis on technological concepts and socio-political concerns. In contrast, potential 
cybersecurity threats to national critical infrastructure are only minimally represented. The survey also examined students’: a) 
level of concern about different cybersecurity threats, b) perceived likelihood they will experience given computer security 
incidents, and c) incidents they have already experienced. Instructors of introductory IS courses can utilize the study findings 
to motivate student interest by building upon topics currently evident in the representation/frame of reference and increase 
student awareness and attention to cybersecurity threats that are missing. Suggested instructional design approaches, tailored 
to the level of awareness/prior knowledge and concern indicated include: 1) a problem-centered approach for topics related to 
personal cybersecurity, 2) demonstrating relevance and utilizing case studies for topics on organizational cybersecurity, and 3) 
collaborative, guided discovery to raise awareness about national security/critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats and 
protections. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity, Student perceptions, Social representation, Instructional pedagogy 
1. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity has become one of the most challenging issues 
of the digital age. Data breaches at major retailers such as 
Target and Neiman-Marcus (Ramji, 2014), serious exposures 
in software used to secure websites and technology products 
such as the OpenSSL Heartbleed Bug (Hackett, 2015), and 
successful attacks to gain access to government agencies’ 
data by hacktivist groups like Anonymous (Kerner, 2013) 
have become almost commonplace events. Surveys of the 
current state of cybersecurity, such as Verizon’s 2015 Data 
Breach Investigations Report (Verizon, 2015) which found 
over 100,000 confirmed security incidents in the prior year 
reported by 70 organizations involving 700 million 
compromised records and an estimated financial loss of $400 
million, paint a vivid picture of the vulnerabilities of 
cybersecurity defenses and the relentless efforts of hackers to 
discover and exploit these weaknesses. New challenges and 
threats are continually emerging. Risk predictions for 2016, 
for example, include the increased spread of 
ransomware/cyberextortion, new vulnerabilities and threats 
due to the growth in cloud computing, and a wider range of 
security threats to industrial control systems via connected 
devices and networked systems through the Internet of 
Things (Tuttle, 2016). 
As information systems (IS) educators, we are 
responsible for preparing our students to be aware of the 
risks in cyberspace, to see potential threats and to make good 
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decisions in their professional and personal lives. While a 
decade ago many colleges and universities did not include 
the topic of IS security in the core body of knowledge 
offered to their students (Rotvoid and Landry, 2007; 
Whitman and Mattord, 2006), today security education and 
training is considered essential in order to prepare students 
for future roles as employees, managers, business owners, 
and members of the boardroom. The importance given to 
instruction in computer/information security can be seen in 
calls for its inclusion as a core component of the curriculum 
for all IS and business students (Piazza, 2006; White, Hewitt, 
and Kruck, 2013) and recommendations for cybersecurity-
related learning objectives/topics for the IS core course in the 
IS 2010 Model Curriculum (Topi et al., 2010) (see Table 1). 
To respond to this mandate, IS educators are challenged with 
determining how best to incorporate computer/information 
security content into IS core courses, updating security-
related content for other classes such as systems analysis and 
design (Salisbury, Ferratt, and Wynn, 2015), and launching 
new programs to meet urgent needs for a cybersecurity 
professional workforce (Burley, Eisenberg, and Goodman, 
2014; Foltz and Renwick, 2011; Locasto et al., 2011). 
 
Learning 
Objectives 
• Understand how to secure information 
systems resources, focusing on both 
human and technological safeguards 
• Evaluate the ethical concerns that 
information systems raise in society and 
the impact of information systems on 
crime, terrorism, and war 
Topics 
 
• Security of information systems 
o Threats to information systems 
o Technology-based safeguards  
o Human-based safeguards 
o Information systems security planning 
and management 
• Information systems ethics and crime 
o Information privacy, accuracy, 
property, and accessibility 
o Computer crime 
o Cyberwar/cyberterrorism 
Table 1. Security-related learning objectives and 
topics in the IS 2010 Model Curriculum – Foundations of 
Information Systems core course (Topi et al., 2010) 
 
The research in this paper focuses on cybersecurity 
education in the IS core course, defined as “The ability to 
protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks” 
(NIST, 2013, p. 58). Several factors make this instruction 
especially challenging. One issue is the rapidly changing 
knowledge base related to cybersecurity as technology 
evolves, new vulnerabilities are identified/exploited by 
hackers, and new mitigation strategies are developed. 
Perhaps an even more challenging issue is the severe 
constraint on lecture-time and assignments that can be 
devoted to security topics due to the other material that must 
be covered. Instructors need strategies to leverage this 
limited time effectively. The purpose of the research study 
presented in this paper is to aid IS educators in that task. 
Instructional design for cybersecurity topics in the IS 
core course begins with establishing learning objectives and 
identifying the high priority topics to be covered. Going 
beyond this, we posit that the design of an effective learning 
environment for this subject matter also depends upon 
understanding the perceptions of cybersecurity risks that 
students bring to the classroom. Unlike some other topics in 
the IS core course where prior exposure has been minimal, 
students are not ‘blank slates’ when it comes to 
cybersecurity. Rather, they bring initial understandings that 
have been shaped through social interaction (media 
coverage, discourse, etc.) and, in some cases, personal 
experiences (Billig, 1996). Reports of successful hacker 
attacks, opinion pieces by industry pundits predicting 
escalating threat levels from cybersecurity breaches, and 
reports of diplomatic negotiations to establish cybersecurity 
norms have become commonplace in the media. Movies 
such as Sneakers, Live Free or Die Hard, and Blackhat have 
brought cybersecurity themes into pop culture. As students 
have been exposed to this discourse and engaged in dialogue 
with friends and family, they have formed initial 
understandings of cybersecurity threats that they bring to IS 
core courses.  
Our aim in this paper is to identify the basic elements of 
students’ sensemaking about cybersecurity risks so that IS 
educators can leverage this knowledge in their instructional 
design. By examining students’ sensemaking about 
cybersecurity, instructors can gain a better understanding of: 
1) the type of risks that are central to students’ perceptions of 
cybersecurity and their understanding of terms related to 
those risks, and 2) the type of risks that are peripheral or 
missing from those understandings. Coverage of the types of 
threats where awareness is high, for example, will require 
less time devoted to introductory material and explanation of 
basic concepts. Students may also be highly motivated to 
deepen their understanding and to learn about the protections 
that can be employed to mitigate these risks. In contrast, 
where awareness of threats is less evident, instructors may 
need to adopt a different instructional approach to fill in 
these blind spots, cover basic concepts, and provide more 
examples to engage student interest and motivate learning. 
For the research, we conducted an online survey of 152 
students at a U.S. university to understand student 
sensemaking about cybersecurity risks. We used an 
inductive, mixed qualitative/quantitative approach utilizing 
social representations (Moscovici, 1981, 1984) as the 
theoretical foundation and analysis of similarity (Flament, 
1986) as the empirical method. Social representations theory 
explores sensemaking processes through which social actors 
co-construct and share representations of social and cultural 
phenomena, in this case “cybersecurity.” Analysis of 
similarity is used to identify the concepts in the 
representation and create a conceptual network of the 
organization of central and peripheral elements in those 
understandings. A second part of the survey explored the 
level of concern students had about the different types of 
cybersecurity threats and perceived likelihood that they 
would experience computer security incidents in the coming 
year. The framework of cybersecurity threats by Cavelty 
(2013) was used to formulate survey items for this part of the 
investigation and to aid in interpretation of the results. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Social representations 
theory and Cavelty’s (2013) framework are described in the 
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following section; analysis of similarity is detailed in the 
Method and Findings section. After presenting the results of 
the study, we discuss implications of the findings for the 
coverage of cybersecurity topics in introductory IS courses 
and offer preliminary suggestions for course design.  
 
2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
2.1 Theory of Social Representations  
A social representation is defined as “a set of concepts, 
statements and explanations originating in daily life in the 
course of inter-individual communications” (Moscovici, 
1981, p. 181). Formed through social discourse (messages 
transmitted through tradition, education, communication 
media, communication with others, etc.) and experiences, 
they are the stock of commonsense knowledge (as opposed 
to scientific or expert knowledge) shared by the members of 
a social collective (Calafat, 1998). A social representation 
provides a cognitive framework to organize our thinking and 
action (Laroche, 1995). Social representations theory posits 
that the concepts forming the representation are organized 
into a double system: 1) a central system, or core concepts, 
that are the stable part of the representation, and 2) 
peripheral concepts that change more rapidly, adapting to 
specific circumstances (Abric, 1994). 
Social representations theory has been used to study a 
wide variety of topics, including IT-related concepts such as 
the digital economy (Alexandra, 2001), the electronic purse 
(Penz, Meier-Pesti, and Kirchler, 2004), IS security in a 
hospital (Vaast, 2007), and electronic health records (Jung, 
Pawlowski, and Wiley-Patton, 2009). Social representations 
theory and methods are well-suited to the current inquiry, 
enabling elicitation and analysis of the commonsense, 
collective understandings of cybersecurity of university 
students in the U.S. The inductive approach used in the study 
ensured that the meanings arose from the data and not from 
the researchers’ preconceptions of cybersecurity. 
 
2.2 Cybersecurity Threat Representations Framework 
The framework developed by Cavelty (2013) identifies three 
categories of cybersecurity threat representations present in 
discursive practices at the macro-level in the U.S. – 
technological, socio-political, and human-machine – and the 
specific threats associated with each of these clusters. 
Different communities of actors (e.g., hacking subculture, 
anti-virus industry, law enforcement, intelligence 
community, Homeland Security, military) are actively 
engaged in shaping these alternative representations which 
influence everyday practices of cybersecurity. As shown in 
Table 2, distinct sets of terms, metaphors, and other 
linguistic devices are associated with each of these 
representations. In the technological framing, for example, 
malware is portrayed using biological terms (virus/worms); 
the socio-political framing focuses on hackers of all forms; 
and the human-machine framing stresses the “complex 
interrelationships between critical infrastructures and the 
cyber-substructure, and a subsequent emphasis on 
vulnerability” (Cavelty, 2013, p. 106). While the framework 
is high-level, its comprehensive coverage of cybersecurity 
threats enabled us to see which elements of the broader 
discourse have been incorporated into students’ sensemaking 
about cybersecurity. 
 
3. METHOD & FINDINGS 
 
3.1 Data Collection and Respondent Demographics 
Data for the study was collected through an online survey of 
students at a university in the Western region of the United 
States. An invitation to participate in the study was extended 
via e-mail to 945 students, including all Honors College 
students and students in 12 classes in various departments 
(e.g., Electrical Engineering, Psychology, Information 
Systems, Environmental Horticultural Science). Participation 
was voluntary and no incentives were provided. 152 students 
(16% response rate) completed the “cybersecurity” word 
association question; 139 of those students also completed 
demographic questions and questions on their level of 
concern about different types of cyber-threats, perceived 
likelihood they would experience computer security 
incidents in the coming year, and personal experience with 
computer security incidents. 
As shown in Table 3, the survey respondents included 
undergraduate students at all levels of study as well as 
graduate students (Master’s programs). They were 
overwhelmingly U.S. students; only two were international 
students. Business had the highest representation of the 
university’s colleges (56%), followed by Liberal Arts (11%), 
Engineering (10%), Science & Mathematics (6%), 
Agriculture, Food & Environmental Sciences (5%), and 
Architecture & Environmental Design (4%) (8% did not 
respond to this question). When asked how often they used a 
computer/mobile device, all except for one participant 
responded Every Day. 
 
3.2 Social Representation of “Cybersecurity” 
A three-part methodology was used to create a map of the 
social representation of “cybersecurity” held by the students. 
The first step was to elicit the semantic universe of the social 
 Technological Cluster 
Socio-Political  
Cluster 
Human-Machine  
Cluster 
T
hr
ea
t 
Malware 
• Network 
disruptions 
• Advanced 
persistent 
threats 
(malware) 
 
Hackers (all 
kinds) 
• Cyber-
criminals 
(nonstate) 
• Cyber-spies 
(state) 
• Cyber-
terrorists 
(nonstate) 
• Cyber-
commands 
(state) 
Complexity 
• Disruptions in 
critical 
infrastructure 
• Cascading 
effects 
• (Catastro-
phic) attacks 
on critical 
infrastructure 
R
ep
re
se
n-
 
ta
tio
ns
 
 
Virus 
• Intruders 
• Weapons 
Lawlessness 
• Anonymity 
 
Vulnerability 
• Unknowability 
• Inevitability 
 
Table 2. Cybersecurity threats/threat representations 
(Cavelty, 2013) 
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representation using the free word association technique 
(Doise, Clemence, and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993). Free word 
association is used to shed light on the representation by 
surfacing those concepts that are most readily accessible in 
memory when the person thinks about the given object 
(Abric, 1994). The second step was to content analyze and  
code the responses to determine the set of concepts in the 
semantic space of the representation. Finally, the results of 
the coding were analyzed to identify the structure of the 
representation, including the central core/periphery elements 
and meaningful associative chains (Abric, 2001). The 
analytic techniques used in this part of the analysis were 
Flament’s (1986) analysis of similarity and Borgatti and 
Everett’s (2000) core/periphery model to clarify the core and 
periphery structure. 
 
3.2.1 Elicitation of the semantic content of the 
representation: The first survey question asked subjects to 
write down the first three words/terms or images that 
immediately come to mind when they see the term 
“cybersecurity.” There were 448 responses to this question.  
 
3.2.2 Content analysis/coding: The responses were content 
analyzed using an inductive process involving detailed 
coding and determination of thematic categories (i.e., 
concepts in the representation). One of the researchers first 
coded the data using an open coding procedure in which 
codes were not predetermined but emerged from the data. 
This yielded 92 detail codes representing the first level of 
abstraction of concepts present in the data. Code labels 
closely followed the wording used in the responses (e.g., 
C39 Credit Cards, C46 Affects Everyone, C80 National 
Defense). In cases where the response contained two 
subjects, multiple codes were assigned. For example, 
“password-protected” was assigned codes C09 Password and 
C47 Safety/Protection. Next, related codes were grouped into 
thematic categories, or topics, as shown in Table 4. Topic 7 
Crime (Financial), for example, combined nine detailed 
codes (C64 Criminals/fraud/theft, C29 Banking, C39 Credit 
cards, C87 Money, and so on). (All but 40 single-instance 
miscellaneous responses (e.g., “hyped up,” “porn”) are 
reflected in the set of topics). A 10% sub-sample of the 
responses was independently re-coded by another faculty 
member using the set of 23 topics. The two raters were in 
agreement on 36 of the 46 codes in the sub-sample 
(consistency rate = .783; Cohen’s Kappa = .762), indicating 
a substantial level of inter-rater reliability (Fleiss, 1981). 
 
3.2.3 Analysis of the structure of the representation: The 
next step in the analysis was to determine the core/periphery 
structure and associations among the 23 concepts (topics) in 
the students’ semantic space for cybersecurity (Abric, 2001).  
Core concepts are the quintessential components that, in 
combination, distinguish the social representation from 
similar or related representations (Tsoukalas, 2006). Abric 
(2001) identified three criteria for inclusion in the central 
core: expressive value, associative value, and symbolic 
value. The methodology used in this study enabled the 
assessment of two of these criteria – expressive and 
associative values - as described below. The third criterion, 
symbolic value, is based on the concept that central elements 
cannot be questioned without affecting the meaning of the 
entire representation. The assessment of symbolic value 
would require much more extensive, in-depth methods such 
as longitudinal studies and is beyond the scope of the present 
study. The representation yielded by the current analysis, 
therefore, should be considered a preliminary structure. 
Expressive value is based on the assumption that central 
elements will be more frequently present in the discourse 
concerning the object than peripheral elements. It was 
assessed by the parameter salience, which was measured by 
computing the frequencies of appearance of elements 
(topics) in the responses (Abric, 2001; Nicolini, 1999). 
College Level 
 Number Percentage 
Freshman 20 13.2% 
Sophomore 13 8.6% 
Junior 52 34.2% 
Senior 40 26.3% 
Graduate Student 14 9.2% 
No Response 13 8.6% 
Total 152 100% 
Age 
 Number Percentage 
18 - 20 39 25.7% 
21 – 22 64 42.1% 
23 – 24 26 17.1% 
25 – 30 8 5.2% 
Over 30 1 .7% 
No Response 14 9.2% 
Total 152 100% 
Table 3. Respondent demographics 
 
 
Topic 1 Hacker/Hacking 
Topic 2 Internet 
Topic 3 Safe/Secure 
Topic 4 Virus/Antivirus 
Topic 5 Password 
Topic 6 Privacy/Surveillance 
Topic 7 Crime (Financial) 
Topic 8 Computer/Network 
Topic 9 Firewall 
Topic 10 Unsafe/Threat 
Topic 11 Malware 
Topic 12 IT/Technology 
Topic 13 Government/Military 
Topic 14 Data 
Topic 15 Encryption 
Topic 16 Breach 
Topic 17 Security Technique (Other) 
Topic 18 Unreliable 
Topic 19 Tech Company 
Topic 20 Cyber-terrorism 
Topic 21 Cyberbullying 
Topic 22 China 
Topic 23 Wireless/Mobile 
Table 4. Topics – Concepts in the social 
representation 
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Associative value assumes that central elements are 
associated with a larger number of elements than periphery 
elements. Two indexes were used to assess associative value: 
sum of similarity and coreness. The sum of similarity 
measure was calculated using the analysis of similarity 
method introduced by Flament (1986). An inter-attribute 
similarity (IAS) matrix is the fundamental component of the 
analysis. Each cell in the IAS matrix contains a Jaccard 
similarity coefficient indicating the degree of co-occurrence 
(proximity) for a given pair of attributes (Hammond, 1993). 
(The IAS matrix for this study is shown in the Appendix). 
Sum of similarity is calculated as the sum of the similarity 
coefficients of each element (topic) to all others in the IAS 
matrix. The higher the sum of similarity value, the closer the 
association of that element with the other elements. 
The final parameter, coreness, is based on the 
core/periphery model by Borgatti and Everett (2000) 
developed to detect a core and periphery structure in network 
data consisting of values representing strengths of 
relationships among items. Coreness is considered a function 
of the closeness (either correlation or Euclidean distance) of 
an element to the center where the strength of the 
relationship between any two elements depends completely 
on the extent to which each is associated with the center 
(Borgatti and Everett, 2000). We used the statistical software 
UCINET 6.0 developed by Borgatti and colleagues to 
generate coreness and membership of elements in the core or 
periphery. The similarity index (IAS) matrix was used as the 
data matrix for this part of the analysis.  
Salience, sum of similarity, and coreness of each topic 
are shown in Table 5. On the basis of the coreness measure, 
5 topics were classified into the core of the social 
representation and the remaining 18 into the periphery. Sum 
of similarity and salience measures also provide support for 
this preliminary core/periphery structure. 
3.2.4 Social representations map: In order to better 
understand the relationships among topics and aid in 
interpretation, the results were represented visually in a 
social representations map. The map is the ‘maximum tree’ 
of the system based on the pair-wise similarity indexes from 
the IAS matrix as defined by Flament (1986). Flament’s 
(1986) notion of the ‘maximum tree’ is equivalent to the 
minimum spanning tree concept from graph theory (Doise, 
Clemence, and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993). Minimum spanning 
trees search for the shortest path (edge lengths) to connect all 
nodes in a way that there is only one link between any two 
nodes. Flament’s ‘maximum tree,’ then, seeks to identify the 
relationships among all concepts within the network of 
concepts in a way that maximizes the overall similarity 
within the map representation. The procedure to construct 
the maximum tree used the nearest neighbor algorithm and 
three parameters drawn from the IAS matrix: (1) the pair-
wise topic similarity (e.g., .110 for T1/T2); (2) the topic’s 
salience (e.g., 73 for T1); and (3) sum of similarity of a 
concept to other concepts (the higher the sum of similarity 
the greater likelihood that the concept occupies a more 
central position in the map). The process was started with all 
23 topics (initial X): 
 
1. From the set of X topics, the one with the highest 
salience was included in the map. 
2. From the set of (X-1) topics, the one with the highest 
similarity (highest Jaccard coefficient from the IAS 
Topic # Topic Sum of Similarity Salience Coreness Membership 
1 Hacker/Hacking 0.785  73 0.688 
CORE 
2 Internet 0.629  40 0.384 
4 Virus/Antivirus 0.586  35 0.285 
5 Password 0.558  32 0.262 
3 Safe/Secure 0.605  38 0.245 
6 Privacy/Surveillance 0.522  26 0.185 
PERIPHERY 
7 Crime (Financial) 0.457  25 0.178 
8 Computer/Network 0.472  22 0.174 
9 Firewall 0.336  18 0.133 
12 IT/Technology 0.252  11 0.093 
11 Malware 0.308  11 0.089 
15 Encryption 0.214  9 0.085 
10 Unsafe/Threat  0.261  15 0.082 
16 Breach 0.252  9 0.080 
13 Government/Military 0.297  9 0.072 
14 Data 0.315  9 0.065 
17 Security Technique (Other) 0.162  7 0.053 
19 Tech Company 0.250  5 0.043 
20 Cyber-terrorism 0.153  5 0.036 
22 China 0.148  4 0.035 
18 Unreliable 0.168  6 0.032 
21 Cyberbullying 0.186  5 0.031 
23 Wireless/Mobile 0.268 4 0.019 
Table 5: Core and periphery membership – Cybersecurity representation elements 
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matrix) to the topic already in the map was added to 
the map. (If there were multiple topics with the same 
similarity, the one with the highest salience was 
picked (Kruskal, 1956). If the salience was also the 
same for the topics, their sum of similarity was 
calculated and used to break the tie.) 
3. From the set of (X-2) topics, the one with the highest 
similarity to any of the topics already in the map was 
added to the map. Ties were broken as described in 
Step 2. 
4. This iterative method was continued until all 
concepts were included in the map. 
 
The map of the students’ social representation of 
cybersecurity is shown in Figure 1. 
 
3.2.5 Interpretation of the social representation map: 
Five concepts form the central core of the students’ 
understanding of cybersecurity. (T1) Hacker/Hacking is the 
dominant concept, most frequently mentioned in responses 
and directly associated with three of the other four core 
concepts. The overwhelming majority of the student 
responses for this concept simply contained the terms 
“hacker” or “hacking,” however a few responses 
differentiated between White Hat and Black Hat hackers. 
(T2) Internet, as the environment for hacking activities, is 
most closely associated with T1. Also directly associated 
with T1 are the core concepts (T4) Virus/Antivirus, 
representing malicious programs and the defenses against 
them, and (T5) Password. The overall objective of 
cybersecurity, (T3) Safe/Secure, is related to the other core 
concepts through T4. 
Next highest frequency peripheral concepts most closely 
linked to the core are the concepts (T6) Privacy/Surveillance 
and (T7) Crime (Financial). Each of these cybersecurity 
threats has other peripheral concepts associated with them in 
the representation. The largest grouping, originating from 
T6, reflects a variety of privacy/surveillance concerns, from 
T6 to (T13) Government/Military, to (T21) Cyberbullying, 
the networking system (T23) Wireless/Mobile and data 
protection method (T15) Encryption. (T22) China is also 
directly related to the privacy/surveillance concept T6. Only 
one peripheral concept, (T19) Tech Company (e.g., Google, 
Microsoft) is directly associated with T7. Another peripheral 
concept cluster is composed of negative aspects related to 
cybersecurity, including (T10) Unsafe/Threat, (T20) Cyber-
T1 
Hacker/
Hacking
T2 
Internet
T5
 Password
T4
 Virus/
Antivirus
T3 
Safe/ 
Secure
 
MAP LEGEND 
 
Topics/Concepts 
• Color: Core - Black; Peripheral - White  
• Circle size: Frequency in the responses (Salience)  
o ≥ 70 
o ≥ 25, < 70 
o ≥ 10, < 25 
o < 10  
 
Linkages (Similarity)  
• Double line:  ≥ .090 
• Dot/dash line:  ≥ .070, < .090 
• Dashed line:  ≥ .051, < .070 
• Plain line: < .051  
T6
Privacy/
Surveillance T7 
Crime
(financial)
T8 
Computer
/Network
T9 
Firewall
T12 
IT/Tech
T10 
Unsafe/ 
Threat
T15
T11 
Malware
T23 T21 T13
T22
T19
T20
T17 T14
T18 T16
Encryption
Wireless/
Mobile
Cyberbullying Government
/Military BreachUnreliable
Tech Company
Cyber-terrorism
Security Technique 
(Other)
China
Data
Figure 1: Students’ Social Representation Map of Cybersecurity
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terrorism, (T18) Unreliable, and (T17) Breach. The threat 
(T11) Malware and barrier (T9) Firewall are associated 
directly with T4. A small cluster of linked general concepts, 
(T8) Computer/network and (T14) Data, follow from T3. 
Finally, (T17) Security techniques (Other) is directly related 
to T5, and (T12) IT/Technology is directly associated to T2. 
While a few of the associations are difficult to interpret, 
there is an apparent rationale for most of the relationships in 
the map. 
3.3 Perceptions of Cybersecurity Threats  
The survey also included questions about the student’s level 
of concern about threats in different domains and the 
perceived likelihood that they would experience certain types 
of computer incidents in the coming year. The first question 
asked: How worried are you about the threat of cyber-
attacks targeting: 1) American companies and financial 
institutions, 2) National critical infrastructure such as the 
electric grid, water and transportation systems, 3) 
How worried are you about the 
threat of cyber-attacks 
targeting: 
Not 
Worried 
(1) 
Slightly 
Worried 
(2) 
Moderately 
Worried 
(3) 
Very 
Worried 
(4) 
n Standard Deviation Mean 
1.   American companies and 
financial institutions 
23 
(16.5%) 
47 
(33.8%) 
51 
(36.7%) 
18 
(12.9%) 
139 .92 2.46 
2.   National critical infrastructure 
such as the electric grid, water 
and transportation systems 
37 
(26.6%) 
44 
(31.7%) 
40 
(28.8%) 
18 
(12.9%) 
139 1.0 2.28 
3.   Classified/sensitive 
information maintained by the 
Federal Government such as 
data for military, diplomatic 
and intelligence operations 
29 
(20.9%) 
36 
(25.9%) 
52 
(37.4%) 
22 
(15.8%) 
139 1.0 2.48 
4.   Your personal 
computing/mobile devices 
 
18 
(12.9%) 
49 
(35.3%) 
48 
(34.5%) 
24 
(17.3%) 
139 .93 2.56 
Table 6: Level of concern about cyber-attacks 
How likely do you 
think it is that you will 
experience a computer 
security incident in the 
next year that results 
in the following?: 
Very 
Unlikely 
(1) 
 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Un-
decided 
(3) 
 
Likely 
(4) 
Very 
Likely 
(5) 
n Standard Deviation Mean 
1.  Financial loss 27 
(19.4%) 
66 
(47.5%) 
30 
(21.6%) 
9 
(6.5%) 
7 
(5.0%) 
139 1.02 2.30 
2.  Exposure of 
personal 
information 
12 
(8.6%) 
40 
(28.8%) 
30 
(21.6%) 
37 
(26.6%) 
20 
(14.4%) 
139 1.22 3.09 
3.   Increased level of 
inconvenience in 
your use of 
computers/mobile 
devices 
14 
(10.1%) 
37 
(26.6%) 
30 
(21.6%) 
43 
(30.9%) 
15 
(10.8%) 
139 1.19 3.06 
4.   Loss of reputation 35 (25.2%) 
66 
(47.5%) 
24 
(17.3%) 
10 
(7.2%) 
4 
(2.9%) 
139 .98 2.15 
5.   Loss of data 14 (10.1%) 
46 
(33.1%) 
38 
(27.3%) 
29 
(20.9%) 
12 
(8.6%) 
139 1.13 2.85 
6.  Damage to personal 
computing/mobile 
devices 
17 
(12.2%) 
50 
(36.0%) 
33 
(23.7%) 
30 
(21.6%) 
9 
(6.5%) 
139 1.13 2.74 
Table 7: Likelihood of a computer incident experience in the next year 
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Classified/sensitive information maintained by the Federal 
Government such as data for military, diplomatic, and 
intelligence operations, 4) Your personal computing/mobile 
devices. The response scale was Not Worried (1); Slightly 
Worried (2); Moderately Worried (3); and Very Worried (4). 
The second question posed was: How likely do you think it is 
that you will experience a computer security incident in the 
next year that results in the following?: 1) Financial loss, 2) 
Exposure of personal information, 3) Increased level of 
inconvenience in your use of computers/mobile devices, 4) 
Loss of reputation, 5) Loss of data, 6) Damage to personal 
computing/mobile devices. A Likert-type scale for responses 
ranged from Very Unlikely (1) to Very Likely (5). 
Descriptive statistics of the responses to these two questions 
are shown in Tables 6 and 7.  
In response to the first question (positive directionality of 
response categories), the students expressed a relatively 
modest level of concern about each of the four types of 
cyber-attacks, with the lowest level of concern (mean = 2.28) 
related to national infrastructure attacks and the highest level 
of concern about attacks targeting their personal 
computing/mobile devices (mean = 2.56). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the potential threats that are more personal and 
visible to students generated slightly greater concern in 
comparison to more remote threats related to business and 
national security. 
Replies to the second question (positive directionality of 
response categories) indicated low expectations by students 
that they would experience any of the computer security 
incident outcomes described in this survey question. Highest 
perceived likelihoods were Exposure of personal information 
(mean = 3.09) and Increased level of inconvenience in their 
use of computers/mobile devices (mean = 3.06). Perceived 
likelihoods of Loss of data and Damage to personal 
computing/mobile devices were less with means of 2.85 and 
2.74, respectively. Outcomes with the lowest perceived 
likelihood were Financial loss (mean = 2.30) and Loss of 
reputation (mean = 2.15). If the range of 2.5 to 3.5 for mean 
outcomes is viewed as neutrality, only Financial Loss and 
Loss of Reputation were non-neutral and both were in the 
“unlikely” direction. 
Finally, students were asked whether they had 
experienced a computer security incident within the last 12 
months. Students answering Yes (23 students (17%)) were 
asked to briefly describe the incident(s). Students had been 
impacted by cybersecurity incidents that had affected a large 
segment of the public (e.g., Target and eBay data breaches, 
Heartbleed vulnerability). Credit card, PayPal, personal e-
mail, and social media accounts had been hacked. Student 
computers were also infected by a variety of viruses and 
other malware. 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
By providing an initial view into student sensemaking about 
cybersecurity, the findings of the study suggest preliminary 
implications for the design of this segment of introductory IS 
core courses. The primary contribution of the study is that it 
sheds light on the view of cybersecurity and cybersecurity 
threats that students may bring to these classes. Faculty can 
use knowledge of students’ frames of reference to engage 
them and motivate learning; to include topics that may need 
to be emphasized to increase student awareness; and to 
stimulate discussion by exploring topics where the students’ 
points of view may differ from the perspectives of experts in 
the area of cybersecurity. In this section, we describe some 
implications for instruction based on interpretations of 
specific parts of the social representation and related student 
responses. In the following section we suggest an overall 
structure of coverage of cybersecurity topics, organized into 
three modules, each based on a different instructional 
approach. 
To identify possible implications for the presentation of 
cybersecurity topics, we return to Cavelty’s (2013) 
framework of cybersecurity threats to identify the extent to 
which each of the three key threat representations is evident 
in the students’ understanding. Examination of the concepts 
in the social representation and detailed responses shows 
evidence of elements of threats/threat representations in both 
the “technological cluster” and the “socio-political cluster.”  
Once the exclusive domain of the computer security 
cognoscenti, technical terms such as Malware, 
Virus/antivirus, Firewall, and Encryption have made their 
way into the lexicon of the general student population. Other 
examples of the specialized terms present in the student 
responses include public keys, RSA, captcha images, WPA2, 
server vault, and two-factor authentication. While not all 
students are likely to be conversant with this vocabulary, it 
appears that some segment of students will have familiarity. 
Cavelty’s (2013) “socio-political” threat cluster focuses 
on hackers, and this was the central concept in the 
representation and most frequent response. Differentiation of 
types of hackers (e.g., hacker criminals, hacker spies, 
terrorist hackers, members of cyber-commands) can be seen 
in the association of the hacker concept to other elements of 
the representation (e.g., Crime (Financial), Cyber-terrorism, 
and Privacy/surveillance). A few students differentiated 
between White Hat and Black Hat hackers and two student 
responses referred to the hacktivist group Anonymous. This 
may be one topic warranting elaboration in a course so that 
students understand the varied motivations, objectives, and 
strategies of different types of hackers. The element China 
signifies the political dimension of cybersecurity in the 
representation and the effect of the media in shaping 
perceptions. This reflects U.S. media reports that the Obama 
administration has strongly challenged China to curb what it 
contends are Chinese cyber-attacks on Americans and 
American companies doing business in China, and denials by 
senior Chinese leaders of state involvement in these 
activities (Barboza, 2014). 
The last cluster in the framework, the “human-machine” 
group concerning cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, was 
not evident in the students’ representation of cybersecurity. It 
was also ranked lowest in level of concern as a target of 
cyber-attacks. This topic in the macro-discourse on 
cybersecurity spotlights threats due to system vulnerabilities 
in critical infrastructure and the inability to cope with 
adverse effects (Cavelty, 2013). Although discussions about 
the likelihood of cyberwar and warnings about the potential 
for cyber-attacks on water, power plants, and other critical 
systems have been frequent topics in the mainstream U.S. 
media over the past year and some 245 attacks on U.S. 
critical infrastructure were reported to the Department of 
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Homeland Security in 2014 (Vicinanzo, 2015), there is little 
evidence of student attention to these issues in the study 
findings. The single exception is the concept Cyber-
terrorism. Some IS instructors may consider these topics 
outside of the scope of their courses, however, we believe 
that awareness of cybersecurity concerns from a political 
perspective, including calls for clearer legal and regulatory 
frameworks, constitutes an important dimension of digital 
citizenship and should be included if possible. This subject is 
also recommended in the IS 2010 Model Curriculum (Topi et 
al., 2010). As noted, these topics are not without controversy 
and can, therefore, provide opportunities for students to 
utilize and strengthen their critical thinking skills as they 
consider the rationales offered by different business and 
political actors to support various positions on these issues. 
Two other observations about the content of the 
representation are worth noting. First is the strong presence 
of both optimistic (Safe/secure) and pessimistic 
(Unsafe/threat, Unreliable) views of cybersecurity. It is 
unclear whether this indicates that students on the whole are 
conflicted in this regard or is the result of individual 
optimistic/pessimistic biases. As this orientation has 
implications on cybersecurity practices, it is an intriguing 
question that warrants further examination. The second 
observation is the concern expressed about 
Privacy/surveillance. Not surprisingly, individual student 
responses included specific references to Edward Snowden 
and NSA/Prism as well as Big Brother. Clearly, this is an 
issue that students have attended to and warrants class 
discussion. Concerns about privacy and surveillance can 
stimulate the desire of students to deepen their understanding 
of the technical as well as societal aspects of cybersecurity. 
 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR CYBERSECURITY 
INSTRUCTION 
 
In this section we build upon the findings of the study to 
suggest a structure and instructional approaches for the 
presentation of cybersecurity topics in IS core courses. The 
beginning point for these recommendations is the 
observation that student awareness, concern, and prior 
knowledge were significantly higher for cybersecurity 
threats that directly affect individuals (e.g., credit card data 
breaches) than for seemingly more distant concerns such as 
threats to organizations and national infrastructure/security. 
Because of these differences, we propose that different 
instructional approaches can provide a better fit for each type 
of threat domain. As detailed below, cybersecurity topics in 
IS core courses can be organized into three mini-modules, 
with each module based on a different instructional design 
method: 1) Personal cybersecurity risks/protections – a 
problem-centered instructional approach, 2) Organizational 
cybersecurity risks/strategies – a focus on demonstrating 
relevance and use of case studies, and 3) National 
security/critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats – 
collaborative guided discovery. 
 
5.1 Personal Cybersecurity Risks/Protections: A 
Problem-Centered Instructional Approach (Module 1) 
For cybersecurity threats that students already see as relevant 
to their personal lives and where they have gained some 
related knowledge of those risks and types of protection, the 
task-centered instructional approach developed by Merrill 
(2002, 2007) provides a good fit. The First Principles of 
Instruction framework developed by Merrill is shown in 
Figure 2. The framework aligns well to this segment of 
cybersecurity curriculum because of its focus on real-world 
problems that students already see as directly relevant to 
their personal lives. In addition, it also involves activating 
relevant previous knowledge students have about the topic.  
The approach is centered on the real-world task or 
problem. The principles represented in the model prescribe a 
cycle of instruction consisting of: a) activation of prior 
experience, b) demonstration of skills, c) application of 
skills, and d) integration of these skills in the context of real-
world problems/tasks (Merrill, 2002). For example, one task-
centered module could focus on the protection of consumer 
data. Sub-topics could include identification, authentication 
mechanisms, passwords, and access control structure. To 
activate relevant previous knowledge, the instructor could 
Figure 2: First Principles of Instruction from Merrill (2007) 
Journal of Information Systems Education, Vol. 26(4) Fall 2015
289
begin by facilitating a class discussion where students talk 
about their personal experiences with data breaches and their 
perceptions of the contributing causes. Encouraging students 
to share personal narratives about cybersecurity incidents 
they or those they know have experienced can heighten 
learning by demonstrating relevance, creating a problem-
space to simulate relevant events, motivating learning, and 
triggering prior knowledge as a foundation for new 
knowledge (Swain, 2014). This might lead, for example, into 
a discussion of default passwords, password strength, 
surveys of password practices, and password encryption. For 
each topic set, the instructor can identify options for 
demonstration and application of knowledge. For passwords, 
for example, the instructor might discuss/demonstrate how to 
form a strong password; students could then form their own 
passwords based on the guidelines and test them using a 
password strength checker such 
as http://blog.kaspersky.com/password-check/. The 
integration phase of the instructional model could be a 
personal password ‘audit’ assignment where students test the 
strength of the types of passwords they are currently using 
(not using actual passwords) and then follow the guidelines 
learned to increase the strength, reporting before and after 
strength values. A next step might be to take the business 
perspective and strategies that can be employed for 
protection of users’ passwords, leading to a discussion of the 
importance of password encryption and demonstration of 
encryption algorithms and discussion/demonstration of other 
modes of authentication. 
While IS instructors may already be using some variety 
of these steps in the coverage of cybersecurity topics, the 
task-centered instructional framework provides a reminder of 
the value of a problem-centered approach and associated set 
of instructional activities. As an additional note, some 
researchers have begun developing and testing novel formats 
for instructional materials to build security knowledge and 
promote protection strategies in the personal computing 
domain. One such example is the work by Zhang-Kennedy 
and colleagues (2016) who created a humorous, interactive 
three-part comic series to help motivate learners’ interest in 
passwords, malware protection, and mobile online privacy. 
That work, titled Secure Comics, is fully available online 
(http://www.versipass.com/edusec).  
5.2 Organizational Cybersecurity Risks/Strategies: 
Demonstrating Relevance and Use of Case Studies 
(Module 2) 
Based on the study findings, we expect that student 
awareness and concern for organizational cybersecurity 
issues will be lower than for personal computing. For this 
domain, the challenge for instructors is to raise the level of 
awareness of organizational security breaches, impacts, and 
avoidance/mitigation strategies. Because students will have a 
stronger readiness to learn when they consider that the 
course material is relevant to them (Knowles, Holton, and 
Swanson, 2012), the first challenge for instructors is to 
demonstrate that organizational cybersecurity is pertinent to 
them now and in the future. One way to generate interest in 
the topic and motivate them to learn more is to introduce 
these issues in contexts they are familiar with, such as 
educational settings and the types of organizations they will 
join in their future careers. For example, the instructor might 
consider inviting a member of their university’s IT security 
team to be a guest speaker for the class. Readings could 
include major cybersecurity surveys such as the Data Breach 
Investigations Report published annually by Verizon, which 
not only identifies incident patterns and trends but also 
categorizes incidents by victim industry and organization 
size. This type of information can demonstrate to students 
that cybersecurity is a serious concern for their future 
employers. Case studies based on real-world incidents can 
also be a valuable teaching device to highlight the threats, 
vulnerabilities, and actions that lead to security incidents, as 
well as how they impact organizations suffering them. Cases 
such as the stakeholder analysis of the TJX Companies Inc. 
data breach by Hovav and Gray (2014), for example, can 
facilitate a fuller understanding of the consequences of 
computer security incidents. Another case appropriate for 
undergraduate students that uses an innovative format is the 
graphic novel version of iPremier: Denial of Service Attack 
by Austin and Short (2009) which raises organizational 
issues of risk management, crisis preparation/crisis 
management, and public disclosure of security risks. 
 
5.3 National Security/Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity Threats – Collaborative Guided Discovery 
(Module 3) 
A third learning goal for IS core courses related to 
cybersecurity is to increase student understanding of the link 
between national security and cyberspace. Instructors face 
three difficult challenges related to student learning on the 
topic of national security/critical infrastructure cybersecurity 
threats. The first is low student awareness and concern about 
the subject, as indicated by the study findings; the second 
issue is the oftentimes abstruse language of discourse used to 
speak about these matters (e.g., cyberterrorism, cyberwar) 
where the precise meanings can be hard to fathom (Cavelty, 
2013); the third is the complexity of the topic, which 
includes political and national security dimensions as well as 
the technical aspects related to different types of threats. 
Given this particular set of challenges, the instructional 
approach we suggest is collaborative discovery, closely 
guided by the instructor (Hmelo-Silver, Duncan, and Chinn, 
2007).  
In the collaborative mode of discovery-based learning, 
students work together in information-seeking, sense-
making, and knowledge-building (Paul and Reddy, 2010). 
Using this approach to build an initial understanding of 
national security/critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats, 
the first step could be to assign each student to search for one 
or more recent articles on the topic in the popular media. In 
this way, students will be introduced different aspects of the 
current discourse. This task could be framed as an 
assignment to prepare for class discussion or as a class 
activity, perhaps working in small groups. The instructor can 
guide the inquiry by providing students with a list of 
example search terms, such as ‘cyberwar,’ ‘cyberterrorism,’ 
‘cyber weapons,’ ‘cyber command,’ ‘critical infrastructure 
attack,’ ‘cyber espionage,’ ‘hacktivism,’ and so on. 
References such as Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What 
Everyone Needs to Know (Singer and Friedman, 2014) and 
Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What 
to Do About It (Clarke and Knake, 2010) can be a source of 
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terms as well as provide instructors with additional 
background and varied perspectives to bring to class 
discussion. First, students will be asked to share what they 
have learned, summarizing key points in the articles they 
read. The instructor can facilitate the learning process by 
visibly recording/categorizing information during student 
reporting and posing questions for elaboration and 
clarification. The goal of this information sharing session 
will be to help students begin to make sense of the discourse, 
e.g., to understand terminology, to become aware of 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities/concerns as well as potential 
consequences, to learn about specific incidents (e.g., Stuxnet 
(Chen, 2010)), and to understand various viewpoints 
regarding threat levels, protections, and mitigation strategies. 
The instructor can facilitate the discussion in ways that 
promote critical thinking by students, adding background 
where needed, clarifying technical features, and so on. Open-
ended discussion questions such as “What are examples of 
critical infrastructure that could potentially be vulnerable to 
cyber-attack?”, “What are governments worried about and 
why?”, “Have there been attempted and successful cyber-
infiltrations into government agencies, the military, and the 
email accounts of government officials and other individuals 
with high security clearances, in the United States as well as 
other nations?”, “How might the Internet of Things pose 
additional concerns?”, “What steps are governments taking 
(or should they be taking) to address these concerns?”, 
“What are some of the major challenges to implementing of 
these protections?”, and “Are there different viewpoints 
related to…?” There is certainly no fixed set of questions or 
order in which they should be asked. The goal is for students 
to become cognitively engaged in the sensemaking and to 
communicate their ideas; the instructor will play a key role 
in facilitating the learning process and providing content 
knowledge on a just-in-time basis (Reynolds, 2016). 
Following the discussion outlined above, the next step 
could be to introduce students to the types of frameworks 
used to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure. Two 
examples are the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model 
(C2M2) 
(http://energy.gov/oe/services/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-
capability-maturity-model-c2m2-program) and the 
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity currently under development by NIST 
(http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/index.cfm). 
Finally, at the conclusion of this last module, students 
can be made aware of the National Cybersecurity Workforce 
Framework, which describes cyber roles and jobs and 
defines the professional requirements in cybersecurity 
(https://niccs.us-cert.gov/training/tc/framework). This may 
serve to stimulate interest in careers in the field.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This study has provided an initial look at student perceptions 
of cybersecurity and threats in cyberspace and outlined a 
suggested instructional design for the coverage of 
cybersecurity topics in introductory IS classes. As an 
exploratory study, however, some limitations need to be 
noted. The primary limitation concerns generalizability. Our 
study explored the viewpoints of students at a single 
university in the U.S. at a given time. The theoretical 
framework of social representations highlights the social 
construction of meaning and constitutive effect played by 
messages transmitted through the communications media, 
the political milieu, and national culture. Given the intensity 
of media reporting about cybersecurity in the mainstream 
media in the U.S., it would not be unexpected to find strong 
similarities in the representations of cybersecurity of students 
at other U.S. universities to the representation in this study. 
There are, however, likely to be significant differences in the 
representations of cybersecurity of students in other 
countries, reflecting differences in media framing, cultural 
influences, and political systems. A second issue is a caveat 
based on the dynamic nature of representations (Abric, 
2001). Commonsense understandings of new concepts such 
as cybersecurity are emergent and will continue to be 
influenced by changing technological developments, 
attempts by different political actors to shape discourse, and 
major computer security incidents visible to the public. The 
representation of cybersecurity in this study, then, provides a 
snapshot view at a given point in time. Both limitations 
noted suggest avenues for future research, including 
comparison of representations in different national cultures 
and longitudinal studies to identify changes in 
understandings of cybersecurity over time. 
Cybersecurity education will continue to be a vital part 
of the preparation of every university student. Instructors of 
core IS courses will need to employ creative instructional 
approaches at the same time that they are challenged to keep 
current in developments in the business and political arenas 
related to cybersecurity as well as technical developments in 
order to enable their students to make good decisions in their 
personal and professional use of information technology. It is 
our hope that this study and suggested instructional 
approaches will provide a measure of value towards that end. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Inter-Attribute Similarity (IAS) Matrix 
(Jaccard Similarity Coefficients) 
 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 
T1 1.000 0.110 0.039 0.085 0.074 0.052 0.054 0.039 0.034 0.038 0.022 0.030 
T2 0.110 1.000 0.047 0.024 0.052 0.048 0.051 0.039 0.021 0.038 0.023 0.062 
T3 0.039 0.047 1.000 0.090 0.036 0.020 0.042 0.063 0.045 0.000 0.038 0.025 
T4 0.085 0.024 0.090 1.000 0.019 0.032 0.011 0.056 0.076 0.000 0.070 0.000 
T5 0.074 0.052 0.036 0.019 1.000 0.045 0.074 0.047 0.053 0.000 0.014 0.000 
T6 0.052 0.048 0.020 0.032 0.045 1.000 0.027 0.040 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.036 
T7 0.054 0.051 0.042 0.011 0.074 0.027 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T8 0.039 0.039 0.063 0.056 0.047 0.040 0.000 1.000 0.015 0.020 0.018 0.019 
T9 0.034 0.021 0.045 0.076 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.015 1.000 0.000 0.022 0.023 
T10 0.038 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.020 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
T11 0.022 0.023 0.038 0.070 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.022 0.000 1.000 0.029 
T12 0.030 0.062 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.019 0.023 0.000 0.029 1.000 
T13 0.030 0.025 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.059 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T14 0.007 0.012 0.038 0.014 0.029 0.036 0.019 0.077 0.022 0.032 0.000 0.029 
T15 0.038 0.012 0.040 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T16 0.038 0.012 0.026 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.021 0.020 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T17 0.015 0.026 0.014 0.000 0.051 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 
T18 0.008 0.013 0.014 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 
T19 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T20 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.037 0.000 
T21 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T22 0.016 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T23 0.000 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 T19 T20 T21 T22 T23 
T1 0.030 0.007 0.038 0.038 0.015 0.008 0.023 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.000 
T2 0.025 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 
T3 0.000 0.038 0.040 0.026 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.014 
T4 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.031 0.016 0.000 0.016 
T5 0.000 0.029 0.031 0.015 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 
T6 0.059 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 
T7 0.021 0.019 0.043 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.024 
T8 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T9 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T10 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T12 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T13 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.053 0.050 0.000 
T14 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T15 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 
T16 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.050 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T19 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 
T20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
T21 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.083 
T22 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
T23 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.083 0.000 1.000 
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